We document substantial management of reported and forecast EPS for analyst-followed firms, with the level of management increasing with share price. Mainly, managers smooth the volatility of reported EPS by using accruals to offset cash flow shocks. Smoother EPS is easier to forecast, resulting in smaller forecast errors. Managers also reduce forecast errors by guiding analysts to increase forecast accuracy. Whereas unmanaged forecast errors are much larger for high price firms, they are compressed to the point they resemble errors for low price firms. Given the remarkable level of management implied by our results, especially for high price firms, we conduct additional robustness analyses and falsification tests. The strongest evidence is observed in investor responses per cent of forecast error: they increase proportionately with share price to compensate for differential compression. We show how this management and associated investor responses potentially bias research studies, and offer ways to offset such bias.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consistent with intuition, forecast error magnitudes generally increase with scale. One notable exception relates to sell-side analysts' forecasts of quarterly earnings per share (EPS) for US firms: forecast error magnitudes remain relatively constant as share price increases (e.g., Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999) . 1 This lack of variation is surprising because magnitudes of actual and forecast EPS increase proportionately with share price and yet magnitudes of the difference (forecast error) do not. To emphasize how unique this empirical regularity is, consider the results in Cheong and Thomas (2011) , hereafter CT.
They show that error magnitudes increase with scale in many other cases: a) analyst forecasts of cash flows; b) analyst forecasts of sales; c) time-series forecasts of EPS for US firms not followed by analysts; and d) analyst forecasts of EPS for some other markets.
CT propose and investigate three explanations for this puzzling lack of scale variation. Their results reject all three explanations but suggest a fourth explanation instead: managers likely play a role. We investigate that possibility and find consistent results. Forecast error magnitudes increase naturally with scale but managers use a combination of earnings smoothing and forecast guidance to reverse that variation.
High price firms compress forecast errors so much that they resemble forecast errors of low price firms.
A Stein (1989) type equilibrium, based on the signal-jamming model used in other contexts by Holmstrom (1982) and Fudentberg and Tirole (1986) , explains why managers differentially compress forecast errors. Managers worry that investors do not adjust for scale and associate larger forecast error magnitudes with higher risk. High price firms compress forecast errors to the point they resemble low price firms. In equilibrium, investors are not fooled and unwind managerial compression of forecast errors. Even though no one is fooled, managers are trapped into compressing forecast errors. Analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, investors overestimate the risk of firms that don't compress forecast errors to expected levels. 2 We consider different ways for managers to shrink EPS forecast error magnitudes, where forecast error equals core EPS-the recurring portion of reported EPS-minus the consensus of analysts' EPS 1 We follow Degeorge et al. (1999) and focus on scale at the share-level, rather than firm-level, and use share price to represent scale. Hermann and Thomas (2005) suggest that sell-side analysts focus on share-level earnings.
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The deeper "why" questions remain unanswered, however: Why is this unusual distribution of forecast errors a stable equilibrium, and how did it first arise? Why aren't similar equilibria observed for cash flows and sales, for US firms not followed by analysts, and for followed firms in some markets such as Japan?
forecasts available just before earnings announcements. Our results suggest that forecast errors are differentially compressed mainly by smoothing: using accruals to offset cash flow shocks. Smoother earnings are easier to forecast, resulting in smaller forecast errors. The negative correlation between seasonally-differenced cash flow per share (CPS) and accruals per share (APS), our measure of smoothing via discretionary accruals, increases from about −0.5 for price decile 1 to about −0.8 for price decile 7.
Increased earnings smoothing offsets entirely any natural increase in EPS volatility. For deciles 8 to 10, however, the smoothing levels remain constant-as if they reach a limit. The remaining scale variation in forecast error magnitudes is eliminated by guiding analyst forecasts toward core EPS to increase forecast accuracy, with the level of guidance increasing from decile 8 to decile 10.
While these results are consistent with managerial intervention, the extent of intervention required is so large and pervasive it strains credulity. Not only is there substantial compression of forecast errors, especially for high price firms, it is sustained over time and widespread across firms. To be sure, alternative explanations exist for some aspects of our results, but they are inconsistent with other aspects of the portfolio of empirical regularities document here and in CT. 3 Unable to generate plausible alternative explanations, we focus on probing the validity of the managerial intervention hypothesis.
We begin by considering falsification tests: we consider two samples that CT's results indicate are different from analyst-followed US firms: a) US firms not followed by analysts, and b) analyst-followed firms in Japan. 4 If the increasingly negative cash flow/accrual correlation mentioned above is due to natural causes, rather than managerial intervention, we should observe similar patterns of scale variation in accruals/cash flow correlations for other samples too. Our results, however, indicate very different patterns for both samples: correlations vary little with scale and do not exhibit non-linearity at price decile 8.
The results we obtain from investor responses provide stronger confirmation of managerial intervention. If managers of decile 10 firms shrink forecast errors much more than managers of decile 1 3
To illustrate the difficulty alternative explanations face, consider as an initial hurdle our findings regarding scale variation in accruals/cash flow correlation and forecast accuracy. While one can conceive of alternative explanations for why correlations become more negative and accuracy increases with share price, it is hard to explain why a) the correlations increase only from decile 1 to 7; b) forecast accuracy increases only from deciles 8 to 10; and c) the combination causes forecast error magnitudes to be the same in all ten deciles. 4 CT observe results similar to those for Japan in three other markets: Brazil, Italy, and Switzerland. We do not include those markets as controls because of limited data availability.
firms, rational investors should respond appropriately: Price responses per cent of forecast error-also known as earnings response coefficient or ERC-should be much higher for decile 10 to offset the greater compression. Moreover, ERC magnitudes should be much higher than levels anticipated by theory describing the determinants of ERC (e.g., Kormendi and Lipe 1987, and Collins and Kothari 1989) , because that theory does not incorporate forecast error compression. Our results are remarkably compatible with both predictions. For the 70 percent of observations with forecast errors in the narrow −5¢ to +5¢ range, ERC varies monotonically between 7 for decile 1 and 50 for decile 10. We show why including the small fraction of remaining observations (about 15 percent in each tail with forecast error magnitudes greater than 5¢) shrinks ERC toward the much lower levels reported in the prior literature. 5 Given that the ERC levels for decile 1 are closer to the levels expected by theory mentioned above, ERCs that are 7 times as high for decile 10 suggest that forecast errors are compressed to one-seventh their unmanaged levels. Additional confirmation is provided by our investigation of analyst-followed firms in Japan: ERC varies much less with price and ERC levels for high price firms are much lower, relative to the US sample.
The type of earnings management we study differs from that studied in recent work. Here, managers smooth the volatility of reported earnings, whereas prior work has mainly investigated management of levels of earnings and EPS, relative to salient targets. Second, analyst forecasts are also managed here, along with reported earnings. Third, the extent of management that occurs is larger in magnitude and more pervasive, across firms and over time. Finally, this management varies in the cross-section with share price, a variable that should not be relevant for earnings management, as it is seemingly arbitrary.
Regardless of the level of managerial involvement, the empirical regularities documented here and in CT suggest the potential for bias to arise if researchers are unaware of those regularities Measures that normally vary with scale (e.g., forecast error magnitudes, forecast dispersion, and volatility) become scaleinvariant, and measures that should not vary normally with scale (e.g., ERCs and forecast pessimism) exhibit scale variation. We describe reasons why this type of management and associated investor responses create bias, and offer ways to detect and mitigate potential bias.
5 Burgstahler and Chuk (2010) and Abarbanell and Park (forthcoming) also document ERCs as high as 30 for small forecast errors. See Section IV for a discussion.
II. KEY RESULTS IN CHEONG AND THOMAS (2011) AND OUR PREDICTIONS.
We review below the key results from CT. (Scale refers to share price.) 6 CT#1. The first moment (means and medians) of EPS forecast error distributions for US firms increases with scale. That is, forecast pessimism increases with scale.
CT#2. The second moment (interquartile ranges and absolute values) of EPS forecast error distributions for US firms varies little with scale. Similar lack of scale variation is observed for the first moment (median) of forecast dispersion.
CT#3. The second moment of seasonally-differenced reported earnings for analyst-followed US firms also varies little with scale for price deciles 1 to 7, but increases with scale for price deciles 8 to 10.
CT#4. CT#2 and CT#3 are not observed for per share sales and per share cash flows for analystfollowed US firms.
CT#5. Cross-sectional variation in CT#2 is not observed along potential omitted correlated variables, such as analyst following, forecast staleness, and return volatility.
CT#6. US firms not followed by analysts deviate from CT#3, as they exhibit scale variation.
CT#7. Cross-country variation is observed for CT#2 and #3, with some countries being closer to the US and others, such as Japan, exhibiting more scale variation.
Based on these findings CT reject the three explanations they propose for CT#2: a) forecast error magnitudes do not vary with scale in nature; b) forecast error magnitudes vary with scale naturally, but are offset exactly by the effects of omitted correlated variables; and c) natural scale variation is offset exactly by differential analyst accuracy that increases with scale. A possible fourth explanation is suggested, however, by CT#3. Managers smooth reported earnings because smoothed earnings are easier to forecast and result in smaller forecast errors. Natural increases in forecast error magnitudes are offset by levels of smoothing that increase with share price. We investigate earnings smoothing, as well as other ways to differentially compress forecast errors.
Ways to alter the second moment of forecast error distributions
We offer a comprehensive approach to consider different ways to suppress natural scale variation in forecast error magnitudes. Rather than use absolute values to measure forecast error magnitudes, we follow the prior literature and use measures of the second moment (variances, interquartile ranges, and standard deviations) and refer to them as volatility measures. We begin with the volatility of shocks to cash 6 CT findings #2 and #3 had been documented earlier by Degeorge et al. (1999). flows, represented by seasonal differences (∆4CPS), which we assume are exogenously determined. (FCSTERR) , based on the most recent forecast (FORECAST). Figure 1 describes the decline in volatility-measured as standard deviation-of surprises at the different stages, from ∆4CPS (the top line) to FCSTERR (the bottom line), for all 10 price deciles.
To investigate managerial involvement in differential forecast error compression, we first derive the determinants of decline in volatility at each stage. To do so, we write a relation that links the two variables above and below each stage in Figure 1 , then take variances of both sides and rearrange terms to describe the decline in variance as a function of two determinants-a variance term and a covariance term.
The relations used to link the two variables for decline in variance at each stage are as follows.
1) ∆4CPS to ∆4EPS_GAAP: we use ∆4EPS_GAAP = ∆4CPS + ∆4APS, where APS is accruals per share.
2) ∆4EPS_GAAP to ∆4EPS_IBES: we use ∆4EPS_IBES =∆4EPS_GAAP − ∆4ONETIME, where ONETIME refers to one-time items removed from reported EPS to obtain core EPS.
3) ∆4EPS_IBES to FCSTERR_9: we use FORECAST_9 = EPS_IBESt-4 + ANALYADJ, where ANALYADJ reflects the adjustment analysts make to a seasonal random walk forecast (EPS_IBESt-4) to generate their early forecasts.
4) FCSTERR_9
to FCSTERR: we use FCSTERR=FCSTERR_9 -REVISION, where REVISION reflects the accuracy improvements that occur in forecast revisions made between early forecasts and the most recent forecast.
Taking variances on both sides of the relations above and rearranging terms generates equations (1) to (4) below. The variance declines observed at each stage are on the left hand side and the corresponding determinants-the variance and covariance terms-are on the right-hand side.
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To the extent managers smooth using real earnings management (e.g., altering maintenance and advertising), cash flows have also been managed to smooth earnings volatility. That is, our evidence based on accruals understates the role played by management in compressing forecast errors.
To identify potential managerial intervention we focus on two non-linearities created by CT#3-reported earnings volatility exhibits no variation with price for deciles 1 to 7 but increases for deciles 8 to 10-for price variation in the four sets of variance/covariance determinants above. First, because cash flow volatility increases with price (CT#4) a non-linearity is created in the gap between the top two lines in Figure 1 , where the gap is the variance decline described in equation (1) . Managerial intervention is indicated if that non-linearity is matched exactly by non-linear price variation in just one of the determinants in equation (1) . Second, because forecast error volatility shows no variation with price (CT#2) a nonlinearity is created in the gap between the bottom line in Figure 1 and the second line from the top, where the gap is the sum of the three variance declines shown in equations (2), (3), and (4). Again, managerial intervention is indicated if non-linearity in that gap is matched exactly by price variation for one of the determinants, but not the other determinant, in those three equations. We anticipate the gap relating to equation (4) to be most relevant, as visual examination of the three gaps in Figure 1 suggests little variation with price for the variance declines in equations (2) and (3).
The resulting predictions-P1.1 to P1.4 below-are based on the premise that any one determinant (variance/covariance terns) is unlikely to exhibit the specific non-linear variation required to explain CT#2, CT#3, and CT#4 if managers do not intervene. Additional confirmation is provided if a determinant that exhibits the required nonlinear variation is also more amenable to manipulation. For example, the accruals/cash flow covariance term in equation (1), which reflects the use of accruals to offset cash flow shocks, is more likely to reflect earnings smoothing than the variance of accruals term.
P1.1:
The variance of ∆4APS or the correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS should decline for price deciles 1 to 7, and then level off for deciles 8 to 10.
As mentioned above, the second determinant-the correlation term-is more likely to capture managerial intent. A cursory understanding of accounting rules suggests that the correlation between cash flow and accruals surprises should be negative, before any managerial efforts to smooth earnings volatility.
For example, a build-up of inventory will cause ∆4CPS to decline and ∆4APS to increase. In addition, any measurement error associated with our measure of cash flow surprise will create an opposite error in accruals surprise, because accruals surprises are obtained by subtracting cash flow surprises from earnings surprises. If differential smoothing plays a role, the correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS, which is expected to be negative, should become increasingly more negative between deciles 1 and 7, and then remain constant at those high negative levels for deciles 8 to 10.
P1.2:
The variance of ∆4ONETIME or the correlation between ∆4ONETIME and ∆4EPS_IBES should increase more for deciles 8 to 10, relative to deciles 1 to 7.
The correlation term reflects efforts to show less volatile core EPS if managers strategically designate positive (negative) components of reported income as one-time items when reported EPS is unusually high (low). As with the accruals/cash flow correlation in prediction P1.1, the correlation term here is expected to be significant even in the absence of managerial intervention. Cohen, Hann, and Ogneva (2007, p. 272) states that "prior to the early 1990s, I/B/E/S did not always adjust actual earnings to exclude items not forecasted by analysts, thereby creating a mismatch between its actual (realized) and forecasted (expected) earnings." Despite this mismatch, we find similar lack of scale variation before 1993.
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The most recent forecast is typically from the same month as the month of earnings announcement, or the prior month if the earnings announcement has already been made before I/B/E/S' cutoff date for that month. For analyses relating to compression of forecast errors, we Winsorize all variables reported in Figure 1 -FCSTERR, FCSTERR_9, and seasonal difference of EPS_IBES, EPS_GAAP, and CPS-at the 5 th and 95 th percentiles. These Winsorized variables are used to derive ∆4APS, ∆4ONETIME, ANALYADJ, and REVISION. Winsorization is not necessary for our research design, but it is convenient as we retain the pattern of forecast error scale-invariance documented in prior research. The literature (e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999 ) has typically used the interquartile range of forecast error distributions as a measure of the magnitudes of forecast errors. We switch from interquartile ranges to variances to allow the decomposition described 11 We use the IBES-CRSP linking program provided on WRDS in combination with the CRSP-COMPUSTAT Merged Database. See https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/ibes/index.cfm. 12 Because net income and cash flows reported on 10-Q reports (and on COMPUSTAT) are cumulative, from the beginning of the fiscal year, we impute quarterly net income and cash flows for all quarters other than the first fiscal quarter by subtracting the corresponding cumulative amounts reported in the prior quarter. 13 Despite its apparent inadequacies, the seasonal random walk expectation model outperforms other models that use more information for out-of-sample predictions (see Francis and Olsen 2011). in Section II. 14 Before Winsorization, we observe a U-shaped pattern across price deciles for variances of forecast error distributions, rather than the flat pattern observed for interquartile ranges. This is because extreme forecast errors are more likely for low and high price deciles. We find that a 5/95 percentile Winsorization mitigates sufficiently the effects of extreme forecast errors observed for low and high price deciles and provides the flat profile of forecast error variances from decile 1 to 10 (CT#2)
Descriptive statistics. of BEGPRICE suggests concentration around the middle of the distribution, which is consistent with "desirable" trading ranges. Firms go public within those ranges and use splits (reverse splits) if prices are far above (below) those ranges. As a result, we expect attributes predicted to be related to share price to vary more for extreme price deciles. The distributions of FORECAST and EPS_IBES are fairly similar, although forecasts tend to be less extreme. The middle of the distribution of FCSTERR is slightly to the right of zero, indicated by a median of +1 ¢, which confirms prior studies that document slight pessimism on average for the most recent forecasts.
Panel B of Table 1 provides medians, computed within price deciles, for the variables in Panel A.
(Patterns are similar for mean values.) The median values of BEGPRICE in row 1 range from about $4 for the lowest price decile to about $67 for the highest price decile. These prices are lower than those reported in CT, possibly because our sample includes the financial crisis period. As described in CT, the results in rows 2, 3, and 5 confirm that consensus forecasts as well as reported and core EPS increase approximately proportionately with share price. The remaining rows are provided for reference.
IV. MANAGERIAL EFFORTS TO COMPRESS FORECAST ERRORS. Prediction P1.1: Differential reduction of volatility from ∆4CPS to ∆4EPS_GAAP
We begin with prediction P1.1, which addresses the two determinants of the gap shown in Figure   1 between the standard deviation of ∆4CPS and ∆4EPS_GAAP. Managerial involvement is suggested if that 14 Our approach in Section II is to cast the decline in volatility at different stages in terms of the variances and covariances described in equations (1) to (4). We are unable to state these relations in terms of interquartile ranges. 15 Two variables-ANALYADJ and REVISION-are affected by the Winsorization discussed above.
gap is explained by the correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS becoming more negative with price between deciles 1 and 7 and holding constant after that. Table 2 , Panel A presents relevant results. The first four rows describe variation with price for four key volatilities already described in Figure 1 . Consistent with CT#2, standard deviations and interquartile ranges (IQR) for FCSTERR r exhibit little variation with price.
16 Consistent with CT#3, standard deviations for ∆4EPS_GAAP are relatively similar across deciles 1 to 7, and increase from deciles 8 to 10. Consistent with CT#4, standard deviations for ∆4CPS increase with scale. The key finding is provided in the bottom two rows, which relate to the second determinant in equation (1). Suggesting managerial involvement, both
Spearman and Pearson correlations become more negative from decile 1 to 7 and then level off. The row above, relating to the first determinant-represented by the standard deviation of ∆4APS-increases with share price, which is inconsistent with prediction P1.1. The net impact of both determinants is in the direction of the second determinant, because it has a bigger impact than the first determinant (as the variances of ∆4APS and ∆4CPS are similar in magnitude, and the correlation magnitudes exceed 0.5).
To provide more reliable evidence on patterns of correlations, we estimate the correlations separately for each firm, using time-series data. Firms are assigned to price deciles based on their modal price decile across years. Untabulated results confirm that most firms move across price deciles over time, mainly because of normal price volatility, especially among the middle price deciles. To obtain a meaningful share price decile classification for each firm, we require a) sufficient time-series data (more than 10 quarters) and b) reasonably stable price levels (price decile equals, or is adjacent to, the modal decile for more than half the available quarters). The first requirement reduces our sample from 8320 to 5036 firms and the second requirement reduces it further to 3942 firms. The number of firms retained in different price deciles, reported in the bottom row of Panel B in Table 2 , suggests that there is more stability of price levels over time for low price firms. Our main finding is that the inferences made based on the 16 There is some evidence of a slight increase in magnitudes of FCSTERR for the higher price decile, whereas the results reported in CT, which are based on a sample period that ends in 2006, exhibits almost no variation with price. Year-by-year analysis reveals a slight increase for high price deciles after 2006. Given that there are other prior years where the opposite pattern is observed, we are unable to judge whether the results for the post 2006 period represent a change in regime or normal variation over time.
cross-sectional results in Panel A are observed again in Panel B. Consistent with managerial involvement, the mean correlations become more negative for deciles 1 to 7 and level off thereafter.
Panel C provides a more direct test of P1.1. The firm-specific Pearson and Spearman correlations reported in Panel B are regressed on price decile (PRCDEC). To estimate potential non-linearity, we allow for a separate slope and intercept for firms in deciles 8 to 10, indicated by the dummy HIPRC. We also include controls for three variables-analyst coverage (CVRGE), forecast dispersion (DISP), and prior sales growth (SLSGR)-that might separately affect, or proxy for variables that affect, correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS. The regression we estimate is given below in equation (5).
Our results are again strongly consistent with P1.1. The coefficient on PRCDEC of about −0.05, representing the per decile decrease in the correlation between deciles 1 and 7, is economically and statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient on PRCDEC*HIPRC, representing the incremental slope for deciles 8 to 10 is positive and of equal magnitude. As the sum of the two coefficients is close to zero, correlations vary little for deciles 8 to 10. Untabulated results show that the coefficients on PRCDEC and PRCDEC*HIPRC are relatively unaffected when we drop the three control variables or add a fourth control variable for firm-age. That is, even though the control variables explain cross-sectional variation in cash flow/accrual correlations, they are unrelated to price variation in that correlation.
We conduct robustness analyses to investigate the extent to which the seasonal random walk process we assume for APS and CPS may not describe well the underlying time-series processes. Our concern is that any error in our measures of APS and CPS varies across price deciles in such a way that it induces the observed correlation between ∆4APS and ∆4CPS. We examine autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations at the first four lags for ∆4APS and ∆4CPS for firms with sufficient time-series data (more than 10 quarters) and reasonably stable price levels over time. While our results indicate non-zero autocorrelations, especially at the fourth lag, we note that the levels of these autocorrelations are similar across price deciles.
17 . Overall, we conclude that measurement error in APS and CPS biases the levels of correlations reported in Table 2 , but the bias is unlikely to become more negative with price up to decile 7 and hold constant after that. We do not estimate discretionary accruals to measure smoothing, because the accruals used to smooth cash flow shocks are mainly captured in nondiscretionary accruals when smoothing is sustained through time (e.g., Lang et al. 2012 ).
18
The main finding in Panels A, B, and C of Table 2 is evidence consistent with substantial and widespread earnings smoothing using discretionary accruals to offset cash flow shocks. The extent of smoothing is particularly high for high price firms. Any natural variation in forecast error magnitudes between deciles 1 and 7 is eliminated by such smoothing. Observing a nonlinearity in the level of smoothing after decile 7 suggests that firms reach a limit beyond which additional smoothing is not the preferred way to further compress forecast errors.
Predictions P2.1 & P2.2: Variation across samples for Prediction P1.1
We turn to the two falsification tests to probe differential earnings smoothing. Prediction P2.1 is based on comparing US firms not followed by analysts with analyst-followed firms. If scale variation in the correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS observed for analyst-followed firms is due to some factor other than managerial intervention, we should observe similar scale variation for non-followed firms. On the other hand, observing little scale variation for not-followed firms is consistent with managers using accruals to smooth earnings only for analyst-followed firms.
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 2 , Panel D. As described in CT, most not-followed firms are in price decile 1. The additional conditions required to estimate firm-specific cash flow/accruals correlations results in only a handful of firms in the remaining deciles. Regardless, we find a relatively flat 17 The high autocorrelations observed at the fourth lag are consistent with a large transitory component in both APS and CPS surprises, suggesting that both variables follow ARIMA (0,1,1) processes. If so, the estimated correlations between seasonally-differenced APS and CPS we report in Table 2 are a function of the true correlation between shocks in APS and CPS and the moving average parameters for APS and CPS. 18 We estimate discretionary accruals using different models offered in the literature for nondiscretionary accruals.
The coefficients on PRCDEC decline by 80 percent, relative to those reported in Table 2 , Panel C, consistent with systematic smoothing being excluded from discretionary accruals. Those correlations remain significant for models that do not adjust for contemporaneous performance, but become insignificant when performance is controlled for, consistent with the view that smoothing is designed to offset contemporaneous performance.
profile in Panel D, quite different from the increasing negative pattern reported in Panel B for analystfollowed firms. 19 This flat profile is consistent with P2.1 and suggests that scale variation observed for analyst-followed firms is due to differential earnings smoothing. We note that the levels of correlations observed in Table 2 , Panel D are substantially negative, suggesting very high levels of smoothing for all not-followed firms. As mentioned earlier, base levels of observed cash flow/accrual correlations-before any smoothing occurs-are expected to be negative, because of accounting rules and error in our cash flow measure. Perhaps, that base level is higher for not-followed firms; i.e., correlations levels are not comparable across Panels D and B.
We conduct a second falsification test based on P2.2. Japanese analyst-followed firms exhibit forecast error magnitudes that increase with scale. (Lack of sufficient data prevents us from considering three other markets that resemble Japan: Brazil, Italy, and Switzerland.) Differential smoothing by US firms (P1.1) is supported if we observe little scale variation in the correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS for Japan. As described in Table 5 , we collect a sample of Japanese firm-years by linking Compustat Global with I/B/E/S. The results reported in Panel A repeat for Japan the analyses reported for US firms in Table   2 , Panel B. The first three rows confirm CT#7: the second moments of FCSTERR and ∆4EPS_GAAP distributions increase steadily across the price deciles, unlike the US results in Table 2 . Rows 4 and 5
indicate that the second moments of ∆4CPS and ∆4APS also increase with scale, similar to the results in Table 2 . The key finding is in rows 6 and 7: unlike the US results in Table 2 , the correlation between ∆4CPS
and ∆4APS for Japanese firms exhibits little variation with scale.
The results in Panel B of Table 5 confirm that inference using a regression analysis, based on equation (6) below, which is adapted from equation (5). Because the results in Panel A do not suggest nonlinearity between price deciles 7 and 8 for Japan, separate coefficients are not estimated for high price firms.
The coefficient on PRCDEC is about −0.01 in Japan, approximately a fifth of the corresponding coefficient in Table 2 , Panel C for US firms. While the correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS becomes more negative with scale for Japan, the rate of decline is much lower than that for the US.
To confirm that the low scale variation and absence of non-linearity observed in Japan for the correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS is not due to the sample selection process used for Japanese firms, we follow a similar process to collect a sample of US firms. 20 We then combine the two samples and estimate jointly the relations estimated in US and Japan, based on equations (5) and (6). We delete the three control variables as untabulated results indicate that their inclusion has little effect on the coefficient estimates on PRCDEC for the Japanese sample and our original US sample. The joint relationship, described in equation (7) below, provides the slope on PRCDEC for US firms and the incremental slope for Japan is provided by JAPAN*PRCDEC.
The results of estimating equation (7) are reported in Panel C of Table 5 . The coefficient on PRCDEC is −0.036, which is statistically and economically significant, although smaller than the −0.049 estimate in Table 2 , Panel B for our full US sample. The incremental slope for Japan-given by the 0.020 coefficient on JAPAN*PRCDEC-is also statistically and economically significant, and of the opposite sign. The results in Panels A, B, and C of Table 5 are consistent with P2.2 as they indicate that the correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS for Japan declines considerably less with scale than in the US and the non-linearity observed in the US around decile 8 is absent in Japan.
Observing cash flow/accruals correlation patterns for both falsification tests that deviate substantially from those for US analyst-followed firms supports the view that the US sample engages in systematic earnings smoothing designed to suppress natural scale variation in EPS forecast errors. 20 In particular, it is easier to link US firms between I/B/E/S and Compustat because of firm identifiers available on CRSP. Firms that change identifiers are more likely to be lost for Japan. Also, daily return data needed to measure price responses are available on CRSP for US firms but are derived from Compustat for Japan. Because of concerns about data errors associated with returns computed from Compustat data, we Winsorize the distribution at 1 and 99 percent each year. CRSP returns are not Winsorized. The US sample we construct for the analyses in Table 5 is collected using the same process as that used for Japan.
Prediction P1.2: Differential reduction of volatility from ∆4EPS_GAAP to ∆4EPS_IBES
The second way to compress forecast errors is to selectively classify components of reported earnings as one-time items (ONETIME) that are excluded from core EPS. According to prediction P1.2, managerial involvement is likely if the variance of ∆4ONETIME or the correlation between ∆4ONETIME
and ∆4EPS_IBES increases with price between deciles 8 and 10, but not between deciles 1 and 7.
As mentioned earlier, the results in Figure 1 suggest that prediction P1.2 likely plays a small role in differential earnings smoothing. It's clear that removing one-time items from reported EPS substantially reduces the volatility of core EPS-reflected in the large gap between the lines for ∆4EPS_GAAP and ∆4EPS_IBES in Figure 1 and the large difference between the volatility levels reported in rows 1 and 2 of Consistent with P1.2, the standard deviation of ∆4ONETIME reported in row 3 exhibits a slight increase for deciles 8 to 10. However the results reported in row 4, indicate an offsetting decline in the correlation terms, which is inconsistent with the increasing pattern predicted by P1.2. Overall, the evidence suggests that managers do not use one-time items to differentially smooth core EPS.
Prediction P1.3: Accuracy of FORECAST_9 versus EPS_IBES from quarter t-4
The third approach we consider to compress forecast errors is to selectively guide the early forecasts of analysts (FORECAST_9) to improve their accuracy as share price increases between deciles 8 and 10, but not between deciles 1 and 7. According to prediction P1.3, this selective approach should be reflected in a reduction in the variance of ANALYADJ or an increase in the correlation between ∆4EPS_IBES and ANALYADJ between deciles 8 and 10.
As discussed earlier, we do not anticipate support for prediction P1.3 because we see little price variation in the superiority of analyst forecasts over a seasonal random-walk forecast. This is based on the gap between ∆4EPS_IBES and FCSTERR_9 in Figure 1 . In fact, the gap is quite small suggesting that early analyst forecasts, made 9 months before the quarter-end, are only marginally more accurate than EPS_IBES from quarter t-4. The first two rows in Panel B of Table 3 confirm the results noted in Figure 1 : the standard deviations of ∆4EPS_IBES and FCSTERR_9 are close to each other and both exhibit a similar increase between deciles 8 to 10.
Returning to prediction P1.3, the variance of ANALYADJ reported in row 3 of Panel B increases slightly from decile 8 to 10, which is contrary to the decline predicted by P1.3. Row 4 indicates a slight increase in correlation from decile 8 to 10, which is consistent with P1.3. As with the use of one-time items, managers do not use guidance to differentially improve the accuracy of early forecasts.
Prediction P1.4: Accuracy of FORECAST versus FORECAST_9
The final approach we consider to compress forecast errors is to selectively guide analysts to improve the accuracy of their most recent forecasts as share price increases between deciles 8 and 10, but not between deciles 1 and 7. According to prediction P1.4, this selective managerial guidance should be reflected in a decrease in the variance of REVISION or an increase in the correlation between FCSTERR_9
and REVISION between deciles 8 and 10.
The large gap between FCSTERR_9 and FCSTERR in Figure 1 suggests that most recent forecasts (FORECAST) are considerably more accurate than early forecasts (FORECAST_9). More important, that gap increases between deciles 8 and 10, which suggests P1.4 may be relevant. The first two rows in Panel C of Table 3 confirm the results noted in Figure 1 : the standard deviations of FCSTERR are considerably lower than those of FCSTERR_9 and that gap increases from decile 8 to decile 10.
Row 3 in Panel C shows that the variance of REVISON increases from decile 8 to 10, which is inconsistent with the decrease predicted by P1.4. Row 4 indicates only a slight increase in correlation from decile 8 to 10, which is marginally consistent with P1.4. Inspection of equation (4) reveals, however, that an increase in the variance of REVISON has a second, indirect effect: it also increases the covariance term.
More important, its effect on the covariance term offsets its direct effect, for two reasons: a) because the variance of REVISION is less than one, the square root of the variance of REVISION grows faster than the variance; and b) the covariance term is multiplied by 2. As a result, increases in the variance of REVISION for deciles 8 to 10 explain the differential improvement in accuracy between early and late forecasts in that range. Analyst forecasts are revised by larger amounts as scale increases between deciles 8 and 10, and those larger revisions compress forecast errors by bringing recent forecasts closer to EPS_IBES. Table 3 confirms the inferences from Panel C using a regression analysis. We use the non-linear relation with scale represented in equation (5), and replace Corr (∆4CPS, ∆4APS) with the standard deviation of REVISION. The standard deviation is estimated annually for the ten price deciles. The coefficient on PRCDEC, which is insignificant, indicates little scale variation in the accuracy improvement for deciles 1 to 7 from revisions in forecasts. The coefficient on HIPRC*PRCDEC, which indicates the incremental scale variation in accuracy for deciles 8 to 10, is positive and significant. The results in Panels C and D suggest that managers guide analyst forecasts to be differentially more accurate for deciles 8 to 10.
Panel D of
If managers are not involved, why would accuracy improvements be similar for deciles 1 to 7, but increase with scale only for deciles 8 to 10?
The results so far suggest that natural scale variation in error magnitudes for analysts' EPS forecasts is suppressed by managers in two ways. Based on the results for predictions P1.1., P2.1 and P2.2, all of the natural scale variation between price deciles 1 and 7 and much of the natural scale variation between deciles 8 and 10 is suppressed by increased earnings smoothing, using accruals to offset cash flow shocks. And the results for prediction P1.4 indicate that any residual scale variation between deciles 8 and 10 is suppressed by increased management guidance designed to improve forecast accuracy.
Prediction P3: Do investors adjust for differential compression of forecast errors?
Managerial efforts to alter reported and forecast EPS suggested by our results is much larger and more pervasive than evidence of management in prior studies, especially for high price firms. Skeptical readers may remain unconvinced because the results so far are based mainly on the correlation between shocks for cash flow and accruals. We turn to Prediction P3, which describes rational investor responses to observed forecast errors, to provide an alternative and more powerful test of managerial intervention. The price response (PRICERESP) to observed forecast errors should be higher for more compressed forecast errors. Panel A of Table 4 ERC is generally close to zero for most price deciles in the large negative and large positive forecast error groups, it is much higher for the small forecast error partition in the middle. 21 More relevant to P3, those ERC values increase sharply with price, from 7.3 for decile 1 to 51.6 for decile 10.
The results in Panel C of Table 4 describe scale variation in ERC based on a regression analysis.
ERC estimated annually within each price decile is regressed on price deciles, separately for the three forecast error groups. Consistent with the results in Table 4 , Panel B ERC varies considerably with scale for the small forecast error group (coefficient of 3.975 on PRCDEC), but exhibits significantly lower scale variation for the large negative and large positive forecast error groups, indicated by similarly large coefficients of the opposite sign on the interactions between PRCDEC and LARGE NEGATIVE and LARGE POSITIVE (-3.883 and -3.657), respectively.
Prediction P4: Scale variation in ERC for Japanese firms.
As with our analysis of earnings smoothing, we turn to a falsification test relating to price responses by investigating scale variation in ERC for analyst-followed firms in Japan. Given CT#7 and our results relating to P2.2, our prediction P4 anticipates relatively low scale variation in ERC for analyst-followed firms in Japan. Observing scale variation in ERC for Japan, similar to the US, is inconsistent with managerial compression of forecast errors. The results in Panel D of Table 5 replicate for Japanese firms the analysis reported in Table 4 , Panel B for US firms. Because forecast error magnitudes vary across price deciles in Japan, we use the 15 th and 85 th percentile of forecast error distributions to partition our sample into large negative, small, and large positive forecast errors. The main finding is that there is relatively little scale variation in ERC for the small forecast error group that includes 70 percent of our Japan sample. Table 5 confirms the results in Panel D using a regression analysis, similar to the analysis for US firms reported in Panel C of Table 4 . Unlike the US sample, there is little scale variation in ERC for Japanese firm-years in the small forecast error subsample, indicated by an insignificant coefficient estimate for PRCDEC.
Panel E of
Again, to investigate the possibility that the results for Japanese price responses are biased toward zero because of the process used to collect our sample and variables, we repeat the same process to collect a control sample of US analyst-followed firms. This control sample and the measures of forecast errors and returns are different than those for the main US sample analyzed so far. The results in Panel F of Table 5 compare scale variation in ERC for Japanese firms with corresponding scale variation for our control US sample. The coefficient estimate for PRCDEC, which reflects scale variation in ERC for US firms, is significantly positive. The coefficient on JAPAN*PRCDEC, which reflects the incremental scale variation for Japan, is significantly negative, suggesting significantly less scale variation in ERC for Japan.
Our investigation of investor responses, relating to predictions P3 and P4, provides the strongest support for the hypothesis that managers intervene to suppress scale variation in forecast errors. Absent differential compression, it is hard to explain why ERC varies so much across price deciles. And it is hard to explain why ERC is so high for US analyst-followed firms in the higher price deciles. Theory describing the determinants of ERC (e.g., Kormendi and Lipe 1987, and Collins and Kothari 1989) has identified persistence, risk, and growth. Predicted levels of ERC, once low persistence earnings components are removed, are expected to be in the neighborhood of 10, representing the inverse of an average assumed discount rate pf 10 percent. ERCs are of course expected to be higher for high growth firms, and should approach the high P/E ratios associated with high growth firms (e.g., Burgstahler and Chuk, 2010) .
Untabulated results show that growth, measured as past growth in Sales, is reasonably similar across deciles (median sales growth is 4% in decile 2, 5% in decile 3, and increases slightly to 7% in decile 9, and 8% in decile 10). Therefore, average ERCs as high as those we observe for high price firms are not predicted by theory. They are, however, explained by forecast error compression.
While very high ERCs-higher than those predicted by theory-have been noted before for small forecast errors, no alternative explanation is offered for why high price firms are associated with very high ERC. Abarbanell and Park (forthcoming) show ERC increasing from about 3 to about 21 across quintiles of PPB, an indicator of firms' propensity to exhibit positive forecast error bias (i.e., beat consensus estimates). These ERC levels are assumed, however, to be exogenously determined, and PPB is the endogenous firm response that is consistent with the model in Fischer and Verrrecchia (2000) .
Burgstahler and Chuk (2010) also document high ERCs, with ERCs rising toward 30 as they narrow the range of forecast errors to ± 0.25 percent of share price. Their focus is on cross-sectional variation in ERC, which they attribute to variation in signal precision, and do not comment on the high ERC levels as they believe it is consistent with high growth firms that have P/E ratios of about 30. While we agree that high growth firms might be associated with high ERC, as discussed above firms in the higher price deciles with very high ERC are not high growth firms. One unusual aspect of their findings is that ERCs increase as the forecast error range narrows, whereas our results in Figure 2 , Panel B, indicate little variation with forecast error magnitudes once the large forecast errors on either side are eliminated. This seeming difference arises because they deflate forecast errors by price. Narrowing the range of deflated forecast errors increases the proportion of high price firms included (as magnitudes of undeflated forecast errors vary little with price), which we show are associated with very high ERCs.
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To review, our results in combination with those in CT are strongly consistent with managers of US analyst-followed firms engaging in substantial and pervasive compression of forecast errors, designed to eliminate scale variation in forecast error magnitudes. Alternative explanations-typically based on omitted, correlated variables-exist for individual results, but they are unlikely to explain the portfolio of results. First, scale invariance is observed only for EPS and only for US analyst-followed firms. It is not observed for cash flows, for sales, for not-followed US firms, and for analyst-followed firms in Japan.
Relatedly, there is little variation across scale in variables that potentially explain these results (CT#5).
Second, the negative correlation between cash flow and accruals shocks becomes more negative, over price deciles 1 to 7, only for US analyst-followed firms. It is relatively scale-invariant for not-followed firms and firms in Japan. Third, forecast accuracy increases only for deciles 8 to 10, and the resulting forecast error magnitudes are almost identical across all ten price deciles. Finally, and most important, ERCs for analystfollowed firms are very high for high price firms and vary substantially with scale in the US, but not in Japan.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF MANAGERIAL/INVESTOR BEHAVIOR FOR RESEARCH
Inferences from studies based on actual/forecast EPS and associated investor responses might be biased if researchers are unaware of the unintuitive empirical regularities documented here and in CT.
Regardless of whether the regularities are due to managerial intervention, the existence of those regularities is sufficient for potential biases to arise. We see three general sources of bias: a) variables that are expected to vary with scale but do not in the data; b) variables that are not expected to vary with scale, but do so in the data; and c) pooling samples that are expected to have similar attributes, but do not in the data. We provide a brief description of the nature of potential biases and ways to mitigate those biases. Our discussion is based on untabulated additional analyses that are available from the authors.
Variables that are (not) expected to vary with scale but do not (do) in the data
CT show that variables such as forecast error magnitudes, forecast dispersion, and volatility of seasonally-differenced earnings that are reasonably expected to vary with scale are in fact relatively scale invariant. Researchers tend to deflate those variables by scale to control for scale variation, not realizing that deflation actually induces a negative relation with scale. 23 At the same time, various firm attributes used as dependent or independent variables are also unexpectedly related to scale (at the share level). As discussed in CT, spurious relations are then created between those firm attributes and the deflated variables mentioned above, through their common relation with scale at the share level.
Similar biases can be caused by variables that vary unexpectedly with scale. CT show that forecast pessimism-observed at short horizons-increases with scale (CT#1), and we show that increases with scale are observed for smoothing via the use of accruals and ERCs. The results in Figure 3 indicate that forecast optimism, observed at longer horizons, also increases with scale. As a byproduct, the "walk-down" from optimistic early forecasts to pessimistic recent forecasts is positively related to scale. Researchers 23 There are many studies that deflate such variables, too many for us to provide a comprehensive list here. For example, Appendix B of CT lists numerous studies that use two of those variables-forecast error magnitudes and dispersion-as dependent or independent variables, and both variables are deflated in the primary analyses in all the studies investigated. In some cases, footnotes indicated that similar results were obtained with undeflated proxies for these two variables; examples include Barron et al. (1999, footnote 13) and Barron (1995, footnote 13) .
unaware of these relations with scale face the same potential for biased inferences mentioned above if these variables are used in regressions where other variables also happen to be related to scale. Untabulated results illustrate these points by replicating the analyses in Thomas (2002) and Ng et al. (2008) .
Pooling samples that are expected to be similar, but are not in the data
The various regularities described here and in CT suggest that key attributes vary unexpectedly across different subsamples. Pooling together different subsamples might bias inferences for a variety of reasons. Related to this issue, deflation, truncation or Winsorization that affects one subsample more than others can have unexpected effects on pooled data. The key is to recognize that differences might exist. If they do, the subsamples should be separately analyzed, or allowed to have different coefficients if they are pooled. We consider first how pooled ERCs substantially overweight and underweight the ERCs of different subsamples, and then provide examples of other instances where pooling might create biases.
Appendix B derives the general relation for ERCs when two subsamples are pooled, which is a function of the separate ERCs, the proportions of each subsample in the pooled sample, the two variances of forecast errors, and two terms are that are relevant if forecasts are systematically optimistic or pessimistic in the subsample. Even though forecast pessimism varies across price deciles (CT#1), we assume as a first 24 While our suggestions appear similar to recommendations in econometrics texts and in prior accounting literature investigating effects of scaling (e.g., Christie, 1987 and Barth and Kallapur, 1996) , the context and motivation here are quite different. In that general setting, the questions of interest are whether: a) both dependent and independent variables should be scaled, b) scaling reduces heteroskedasticity, and c) scaling by a variable other than the unobservable true scale variable induces bias in estimated coefficients. We, on the other hand, are concerned with scaling just one variable, either the dependent or an independent variable, and our focus is on bias induced by researchers not incorporating the behavior of managers and investors.
approximation that forecasts are unbiased. That allows us to state the pooled ERC as a weighted average of the two separate ERCs and the weight is the product of the proportion represented in the pooled sample and variance of forecast errors (relation B7). Teets and Wasley (1996) offer a related expression.
Even though the majority of our sample that lies in the small forecast error group is associated with relatively high ERCs, adding the few observations with large positive/negative forecast errors pulls the pooled ERC down dramatically. This is because the low ERCs of observations with large forecast errors, and therefore very large forecast error variances, have a disproportionate impact on the pooled ERC. The results reported in the bottom row of Panel B in Table 4 describe the extent to which the pooled ERC is pulled toward zero. In contrast, pooling across price deciles within the three forecast error groups in Panel B results in an ERC reported in the right-most column (All) that is a simple average of the 10 ERCs. This is because the variances of forecast errors do not vary much across the 10 price deciles.
Unlike the ERCs discussed so far, which are based on regressions of undeflated price responses on earnings surprises, prior research has estimated these regressions after deflating both variables, typically by price per share. consensus by a penny is bad news for low price firms that are expected on average to meet forecast, but it is really bad news for high price firms that are expected on average to beat forecast by 2¢.
Another possible case of bias created by pooling arises in studies that pool analyst-followed firms with firms not covered by analysts. Given that the two groups of firms, with and without analyst following, exhibit different relations between scale and different variables noted here and in CT, pooling the two groups may affect inferences if levels of the explanatory variables differ across the groups. Again, one solution is to separately analyze the two sets of firms or explicitly allow for separate variation if pooling is called for.
A final example relates to discontinuities in distributions of actual and forecast earnings around benchmarks. As described in Figure 2 , Panel A, the discontinuities in forecast error distributions between −1 and 0¢ and between 0 and +1¢ vary with share price. Untabulated results indicate that they also vary with forecast dispersion. 26 Pooling across groups with dissimilar distributions can either blur existing discontinuities or create discontinuities where none exist. Similarly, scaling variables before pooling can create discontinuities or blur discontinuities that exist in the separate groups. We suggest that researchers be aware of the substantial potential for cross-sectional variation in different attributes based on scale at the share level, and either explicitly control for that variation or investigate subgroups separately.
VI. CONCLUSION
The results in CT regarding limited scale variation in the volatility of reported earnings suggest an intriguing possible explanation for the lack of scale variation observed for EPS forecast error magnitudes for analyst-followed U.S. firms (Degeorge et al. 1999) . Perhaps forecast error magnitudes naturally increase with scale but managers offset that variation by compressing forecast errors. They do so by smoothing reported earnings, which makes forecasts more accurate, which then compresses forecast errors. And the level of smoothing increases with scale in such a way that the compressed forecast errors observed in the data are of the same magnitude for low and high price shares. The amount of smoothing required to achieve this outcome is very large, however, especially for higher price firms. And these levels of smoothing have to be undertaken by most firms in most quarters. The scale and scope of smoothing required casts doubt on whether this strategy is indeed employed.
Our results provide considerable support for the smoothing hypothesis. The negative correlation between seasonally-differenced per share cash flows and accruals increases sufficiently over deciles 1 to 7 to completely offset natural scale variation in volatility of reported earnings and forecast error magnitudes.
If these correlations became more negative with scale for reasons other than managerial smoothing, they should exhibit similar patterns in other samples, such as US firms not followed by analysts and Japanese firms followed by analysts. Consistent with managerial smoothing for analyst-followed firms in the US, we do not find similar patterns for these two samples.
Our results also provide considerable support for differential managerial guidance. Forecast revisions between early and the most recent forecasts increase with scale, but only for price deciles 8 to 10.
All variation in forecast error magnitudes that is not removed by differential earnings smoothing is eliminated by differential forecast guidance. This combination of earnings smoothing and forecast guidance completely eliminates any natural scale variation in forecast error magnitudes.
To confirm managerial compression of forecast errors we examine price responses to observed forecast errors. If investors are aware of differential forecast error compression, they should adjust and respond to the forecast errors that would have been observed before compression. In essence, they should respond more per cent of observed forecast error for higher price firms with more compressed forecast errors. Again, our evidence is consistent with differential compression. Not only do price responses increase substantially with price, the levels of price response for high price firms are so high that they can only be due to forecast error compression. Again, observing different price response results for Japanese firms suggests that the US results are due to managerial intervention, not omitted variables correlated with price.
In addition to providing a better understanding of the behavior of managers, investors, and analysts, our results also have implications for research that has generally been unaware of these behaviors. Many variables that should intuitively increase with scale do not in the data. Conversely, other variables that should not increase with scale do in fact vary with scale. Biases arise because many dependent and independent variables used in studies happen to be correlated with share price. Becoming familiar with these and related aspects of the role of scale at the share level should help avoid biased inferences. Amount by which analysts adjust core EPS for quarter t-4, when making forecast 9 months before quarter-end for quarter t.
Share price of firm at the beginning of calendar quarter that includes the fiscal quarter-end date.
Share price from CRSP (WRDS filename is crsp.msf).
CAR
Cumulative abnormal stock returns over 22 trading days leading up to and including the earnings announcement. § Cumulative stock returns from trading day -20 to day +1, minus cumulative market returns over the same period (WRDS filename is crsp.dsf).
CPS * (in $)
Cash flow per share.
Quarterly net cash flow from operating activities (data item #oancfy from WRDS filename comp.fundq), divided by # of common shares used by COMPUSTAT to calculate basic/diluted EPS (data item #cshprq or #cshfdq), depending on whether FORECAST is made on a basic/diluted basis.
CVRGE
Number of estimates that constitute FORECAST.
I/B/E/S Unadjusted Summary Data (WRDS file name is ibes. statsumu_epsus).

DISP
Standard deviation of the individual analyst's forecasts that constitute FORECAST.
See description provided for FORECAST.
EPS_GAAP (in $)
Actual quarterly earnings per share before extraordinary items, as derived from the Cash Flow Statement. * Quarterly Income from Cash Flow Statement (data item #ibcy from WRDS filename comp.fundq), divided by # of common shares used by COMPUSTAT to calculate basic/diluted EPS (data item #cshprq or #cshfdq), depending on whether FORECAST is made on a basic/diluted basis. If EPS_GAAP is missing, we substitute it with data item #epspxq or #epsfxq from COMPUSTAT, depending on whether FORECAST is made on a basic/diluted basis.
EPS_IBES (in $)
Actual quarterly earnings per share (EPS), as reported by I/B/E/S, after I/B/E/S has adjusted it "for comparability with estimates." Actual quarterly EPS is obtained from I/B/E/S (WRDS filename is ibes.actu_epsus), which is unadjusted for stock splits.
Label
Description
Source FCSTERR (in $) EPS forecast error, relative to the most recent consensus forecast before earnings is announced.
Most recent consensus (mean) estimate of EPS_IBES for the firm-quarter.
I/B/E/S summary file (WRDS filename is ibes.statsumu_epsus), which is unadjusted for stock splits.
The consensus (mean) estimate of EPS_IBES made n months before quarter-end. (n=0 corresponds to the last month of the quarter).
HIPRC
Dummy for high price deciles that equals one for price deciles 8 to 10, and zero otherwise. Cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) multiplied by the closing stock price 21 trading days prior to earnings announcement (WRDS filename is crsp.dsf).
REVISION (in $)
EPS forecast revision from nine months before quarter-end to most recent forecast before earnings announcement.
EPS forecast is obtained from the I/B/E/S summary file (WRDS filename is ibes.statsumu_epsus), which is unadjusted for stock splits.
REV (in $)
EPS forecast revision from the last month of the quarter to the month with the most recent consensus before earnings announcement.
REV = FORECAST_0 -FORECAST SLSGR
Sales growth = ∆4Salest / Salest Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly (comp.fundq) ∆4
Operator to denote seasonal difference. ∆4Xt = Xt -Xt-4 * As the values on 10-Q cash flow statements (and on COMPUSTAT) are cumulative, from the beginning of the fiscal year, we impute quarterly values for all quarters other than the first fiscal quarter by subtracting the cumulative values from the prior quarter.
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Appendix B: Derivation of relevant relationships (I) Implication for Earnings Response Coefficient
Given that the variance of forecast errors is relatively constant across price deciles, and given that price responses (PRICERESP) to those forecast errors varies proportionately with price, we consider next how these two patterns affect variation across price deciles in the ERC, or Earnings Response Coefficient, which is the slope of a regression of price response on forecast errors.
(a) Undeflated regression. We consider first the case where both variables are undeflated. The slope from this regression is
If the correlation between FCSTERR and PRICERESP does not vary much with price, ERC should increase with price because PRICERESP increases with price.
The corresponding slope (ERC) from a price-deflated regression, where both per share price responses and forecast errors are deflected by lagged share price (LPRICE)
When price-deflated regressions are estimated within price deciles, for which price is approximately a constant, LPRICE cancels out between the numerator and denominator. If so, the expression in (B14) reverts to the expression in (B13) 
�
When pooling together the two samples, we allow for the proportion of observations from sample 1 (p) to differ from that for sample 2 (1-p). The slope for the pooled sample is β, and it equals cov (x,y)/var(x). Manipulating terms, we can show that
If the means of x1 and x2 are approximately zero (because forecast errors should be centered on zero), the expressions B3 and B4 simplify as follows.
The pooled slope for this special case is given by
As a result, the pooled slope is a weighted average of the separate slopes for the two samples, where the weights are the product of the fractions of the pooled sample for each sample times the variance of the regressors for each sample; i.e., p var(x1) and (1-p) var(x2).
Table 1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
The sample contains 199,486 firm-quarters derived from U.S. firms on I/B/E/S with non-missing data, fiscal period end date between January 1993 and December 2013, and at least three EPS forecasts from analysts. Panel A reports the number of observations (N), the mean, standard deviation (StdDev), interquartile range (IQR), minimum (min), 25 th percentile (p25), median, 75 th percentile (p75), and maximum (max) for different variables. Panel B reports the medians of different variables across deciles of BEGPRICE, which is the beginning-of-quarter share price. Price deciles are computed at the beginning of each calendar quarter for fiscal quarters ending in that quarter, and the lowest (highest) price decile is denoted by 1 (10) . FORECAST is the most recent consensus (mean) EPS forecast for that firm-quarter, EPS_IBES is the actual quarterly EPS as reported by I/B/E/S, and FCSTERR is defined as EPS_IBES minus FORECAST. Earnings per share (EPS_GAAP) is the per share quarterly income before extraordinary items, obtained from the Cash Flow Statement. Cash flow per share (CPS) is the per share net cash flow from operating activities. Accrual per share (APS) equals EPS_GAAP minus CPS. One-time item (ONETIME) is defined as EPS_GAAP minus EPS_IBES. ANALYADJ is the implicit adjustment made by analysts to the actual EPS for quarter t-4 (EPS_IBESt-4) to derive the forecast made 9 months before the quarter-end (FORECAST_9). REVISION is the EPS forecast revision from nine months before quarter-end to the most recent forecast before earnings announcement. PRICERESP is the price response over 22 trading days, adjusted for market movements. The variables used to derive ANALYADJ (= ∆4EPS_IBES − FCSTERR_9) and REVISION (= FCSTERR_9 − FCSTERR), are Winsorized at 5% and 95% each year. All variables are denominated in dollars and are described in more detail in Appendix A. Earnings per share (EPS) smoothing should increase the magnitude of the normally negative correlation between unexpected per share cash flows (CPS) and accruals (APS). Panels A, B, and C refer to Prediction P1.1, and Panel D refers to prediction P2.1. We use seasonal differences of EPS, CPS, and APS, represented by ∆4EPS_GAAP, ∆4CPS, and ∆4APS, respectively, to proxy for the corresponding unexpected components. We investigate patterns of EPS smoothing across deciles of BEGPRICE, the beginning-of-quarter share price. Price deciles are computed at the beginning of each calendar quarter for fiscal quarters ending in that quarter, and the lowest (highest) price decile is denoted by 1 (10). In Panel A, using the pooled sample in each price decile, we report the volatilities of ∆4EPS_GAAP, ∆4CPS, and ∆4APS, measured by their standard deviations, and the correlation between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS. For the firm-specific results in Panel B, we assign each firm to its modal price decile if a) more than 10 quarters of data are available and b) the price decile for more than half the quarters equals, or is adjacent to, the modal price decile. We report the mean volatilities of ∆4EPS_GAAP, ∆4CPS, and ∆4APS, and correlations between ∆4CPS and ∆4APS. The variables ∆4EPS_GAAP and ∆4CPS are Winsorized at 5% and 95% each year, and ∆4APS is derived from ∆4EPS_GAAP − ∆4CPS. In Panel C, we report a regression analysis of the firm-specific correlations on price deciles. Significance levels for the t statistics, reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. In Panel D, we repeat the analysis in Panel B using firms not followed by analysts. All variables are denominated in dollars and are described in more detail in Appendix A.
Panel A: Volatilities of forecast error (FCSTERR), unexpected earnings per share (EPS), cash flow per share (CPS), and accruals per share (APS), and the correlation between unexpected APS and CPS, estimated using pooled samples for each price decile. 172,674 firm-quarter observations. Table describes how ERC varies with share price and magnitude of forecast errors. We also examine the impact of pooling subgroups of firms with different ERC. Our I/B/E/S sample of 197,004 firm-quarters with available data is split into price deciles based on beginning of quarter share price (BEGPRICE). The sample is also split into three subgroups based on forecast error ranges: a) large negative (< -5¢); b) small (between -5¢ and +5¢); and c) large positive (> +5¢). In the regression analysis, t statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are denominated in dollars and are described in more detail in Appendix A Our sample in this Table consists of 11,974 Japanese and 63,660 U.S. firm-year observations, with fiscal period end date between January 1993 and December 2013. We report annual data, because quarterly data are scarce for Japanese firms. The sample is constructed by linking the Compustat database (including Compustat Global) with the I/B/E/S database, using the most recent CUSIP (for U.S. firms) or SEDOL (for Japan) as firm identifier. Because Compustat does not track the historical CUSIP or SEDOL code, multiple Compustat firms could be linked to the same I/B/E/S firm. We exclude such observations from our sample to avoid mismatches between forecast error from I/B/E/S and stock return from Compustat. Stock return is computed using the stock price data in Compustat daily securities file, adjusted for stock splits and dividends. We compute the raw return over 30 calendar days (from day -28 to +1). If there is no stock return data available on either the start or end date (e.g., holiday or weekend), we incrementally expand the return window up to 35 calendar days. To alleviate the possibility of data error in Compustat stock price data, we Winsorize the stock return at 1% each year, separately for both the US and Japan. To rule out the possibility that differences in sample selection (e.g., linking procedure) may drive our results for Japanese firms, we create a control US sample with annual data obtained using the same sample selection process (see panels C and F). In the regression analyses, t statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate, and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables for firms from Japan (US) are denominated in Yen (dollars) and are described in more detail in Tables 2, 4 , and Appendix A. , and the correlation between unexpected APS and CPS, We assign each firm to its modal price decile if a) more than 10 years of data are available and b) the price decile for more than half the years equals, or is adjacent to, the modal price decile. Various statistics are estimated in time-series for each firm, and the means (across firms) and the number of firms in each price decile are reported below. 
Figure 1 Volatility of different variables across deciles of share price
This Figure describes the path of volatility reduction from unexpected cash flows to analyst forecast errors, through the use of accruals, one-time items, analyst adjustment, and management guidance. We report the standard deviation of different variables across deciles of BEGPRICE, which is the beginning-of-quarter share price. Price deciles are computed at the beginning of each calendar quarter for fiscal quarters ending in that quarter, and the lowest (highest) price decile is denoted by 1 (10) . FORECAST is the most recent consensus (mean) EPS forecast for that firm-quarter, EPS_IBES is the actual quarterly EPS as reported by I/B/E/S, and FCSTERR is defined as EPS_IBES minus FORECAST. FCSTERR_9 is the forecast error corresponding to forecasts made 9 months before quarter-end. Earnings per share (EPS_GAAP) is the per share quarterly income before extraordinary items, obtained from the Cash Flow Statement. Cash flow per share (CPS) is the per share net cash flow from operating activities. ∆4EPS_IBES, ∆4EPS_GAAP, and ∆4CPS, are the seasonally differenced value of EPS_IBES, EPS_GAAP, and CPS respectively. The variables FCSTERR, FCSTERR_9, ∆4EPS_IBES, ∆4EPS_GAAP, and ∆4CPS are Winsorized at 5% and 95% each year. Our I/B/E/S sample of 199,486 firm-quarters with available data is split into price deciles based on beginning of quarter share price. Price deciles are computed at the beginning of each calendar quarter for fiscal quarters ending in that quarter, and the lowest (highest) price decile is denoted by 1 (10). The histograms in Panel A provide the number of firm quarters with forecast errors that lie within each cent between -10 and +10¢. All observations with forecast errors ≤ -10¢ (≥ 10¢) are included in the left-most (right-most) group in each plot. Panel B provides the mean price response (in $) over the 22-trading-day period prior to earnings announcements for the forecast error subgroups. For brevity, we provide plots for only 3 price deciles (deciles 1, 5, and 10) for Panels A and B. Panel C provides the ERC (slope from regression of 22-day price response on forecast error, estimated separately for each price decile over three forecast error ranges: < -5¢, between -5 and +5¢, and > +5¢.
Panel A: Frequency of firm-quarters for each cent of forecast error (the -10 and +10 groups also include all observations <-10 and >+10, respectively).
